

ROGET ROGERED – Inaugural Essay for the ChitChatClub by Kenneth Quandt – May2021

Peter Mark Roget was born in 1779, of Huguenot Swiss father Jean and a French mother Catherine de Romilly, sister of the famous English statesman Samuel, and lived a long life in England as a scientist and a physician. His name has become a household word not for those activities but for his *Thesaurus*, his treasury of words; but he produced this only in his retirement around age seventy, after leaving behind those professions and his service of some thirty years to the Royal Society and other the ChitChatClubs of the time.

To collect a treasure-trove of words for his own use he began in his twenties, as a hobby, as he tells us in his Introduction to the First Edition of the work, published fifty years later, in 1852. He would continue with some nineteen revised editions up to the time of his death in 1869; the work was then taken up by his son John, named after his father; and then by his John's son, Samuel Romilly Roget, named after his mother and her brother, who fathered Roget after his natural father Jean passed away in Roget's early childhood. Roget's original notebook compiled continuously from 1805, had been lost to posterity until 1992 when it suddenly showed up at auction in London, and is now housed at the Karpeles Museum of Santa Barbara. I have not seen it, nor have I seen the original edition of 1852; but Roget's own third edition, of 1854 or so, can be viewed online at the fantastic site, archive.org – which I want to be sure we all know about.

He is known with some condescension as a classifier, “The Man Who Made Lists” being the title of his journalistic second biography; and again rather condescendingly he is pitied for the emotional challenges due to the family deaths all around him, first of his father at age five; then declining sanity and death of his mother; then his marriage at fifty, soon ended by the death of his wife after eight years; then the insanity and death of his daughter by that wife. Indeed he compiled and kept a list of these deaths over the years, which brings the caricatures together in one. But in truth his prolific and industrious output could only be explained by these prejudices about him if it were maudlin and obsessive; upon inspection however everything he wrote is pervaded with cheer and charm and a light touch. This condescending view, among other things, I hope to correct in this Essay, my inaugural contribution to our august institution, which was founded five years after Roget's death. And if in my closing remarks and theme I shall bring up issues to be presented more competently by our venerable Dean Jones, for whom I am standing in this month, let this be mistaken as some sort of homage to him – or revenge -- offered by your newest and therefore least venerated member.

Roget's *ingenuity* is evinced by the breadth and range of his insights, represented in a large bibliography of papers and presentations for the Royal Society and elsewhere. Characteristic is his discovery and description how the retina of the eye retains an afterimage long enough that, as Hollywood would discover a century later, the sequence of images in a motion picture do not appear to flicker but seem a continuous flow. Roget was lionized by the motion picture industry in the 1920s because of this, but lionized also, and about the same time, in connection with the Crossword Puzzle Craze, for which his *Thesaurus* came into strong demand, to be employed as a dictionary of synonyms. By this back-road we reach the book itself.

His Great Idea here, as he describes it in the Introduction to the original *Thesaurus*, was to present to writers and speakers some relief when they get stuck looking for the right word. We know the experience well; it is both painful and paradoxical: somehow we know where to look but seem unable to find. Roget had had an intuition since his twenties that the problem could be alleviated by collecting words that would come to be called synonyms and arranging them in two antonymical columns.

In order to group together such words, including catchphrases, Roget needed to create places to locate them, on the pages of a book, and these places – called in antiquity topics, which means places – these places are the *things* we talk about, the *realities* we use words to depict. But now Roget needs to map out the world and break it into these places, including also such things as thoughts, activities and dreams – indeed everything we talk about. Even if his need for such a classification was unique and unprecedented, and it largely was, the act of classifying everything had already been done for other purposes – and now I give you some examples.

First, Aristotle’s categories – known by its Latin name *Praedicatmenta*, meaning predicates:

Aristotle’s Ten Categories

(from *The Categories*, the first book in his “Organon,” or Logic Treatises)

SUBSTANCE

Always a subject, never a predicate

QUANTITY

How much, How many (continuous or discontinuous)

QUALITY

color, ability

RELATIVE

double, on the left, smarter

PLACE WHERE

at home, in Paris

TIME WHEN

tomorrow, last year

BEING IN A POSE

lying down, standing

BEING IN A STATE

frozen, shod, asleep

DOING SOMETHING

(affecting something)

UNDERGOING SOMETHING

(being affected by something)

It is a categorization of the nine kinds of things one could predicate of something – a substance (which is the first of the ten categories), and therefore a categorization of anything that could be “said.” Now the work that presents this classification – the *Categories* -- is itself placed at the beginning another classification, that of the works of Aristotle as they were originally collected

three hundred years later by Andronicus of Rhodes -- a “Hellenistic” philosopher, if you will, in the sense of the systematizers in the aftermath of the great philosophical explosion from Socrates to Plato to Aristotle.

Works of Aristotle by Title
as Ordered by Andronicus of Rhodes (fl. 60BC)

LOGIC

- Categories
- On Interpretation
- Prior Analytics
- Posterior Analytics
- Topics
- Sophistical Refutations

NATURE

- Physics
- On the Heavens
- On Coming to Be and Passing Away
- Meteorology
- On the Soul
- Parva Naturalia (Memory, Dreams, etc.)
- History of Animals
- Parts of Animals
- Movement of Animals
- Progression of Animals
- Generation of Animals

Metaphysics

ETHICS

- Nicomachean Ethics
- Politics
- Rhetoric
- Poetics

Now if you look at the manner of Andronicus’s organization you see three steps: Logic, Nature (Physics in Greek), Ethics. This triad he inherited from his times – it was probably first set out by the Stoics; and we all know how important morality was to the Stoics, without which it would have been meaningless to be stoical. The arrangement, that is, ascends from the rules of thinking through the world we think about and think in, to the choice of conduct in our lives.

I want you to notice for your edification the position given to the work that Andronicus called the “Metaphysics”: this was a collection he made of essays by Aristotle that for him were not a system of chapters, as Andronicus’s collection makes them seem: to the contrary it was a catch-all designation for treatises that Andronicus could not place elsewhere, treating of an outline of the history of philosophy, of the distinction between the potential and the actual, a lexicon of philosophical terms like “being” and “essence” and –yes—the question of god or gods.

These separate treatises had to be put somewhere, and Andronicus brought them together and placed them “after” the physical treatises, whence the term *meta ta physica*, or metaphysics. In a sense they are the most truly philosophical of Aristotle’s works, and yet they had no systematic place within the works of the philosopher, Aristotle. For philosophy was not systematic until it was over. For Socrates it was talking in the Agora; for Plato a depiction of such talks in his dialogues; and for Aristotle a variegated series of disquisitions on areas of life and reality that could be thought about, inquired after, and described.

Next we shift gears to a song that has made its way out of the Protestant version of *Daniel*, but came back into the *Book of Common Prayer* as its longest Canticle: it is the song reputed to have been sung by Schadrach, Meshach, and Abednego while they were in the fiery furnace. It is their praise of and prayer to the Creator, whom they believe will preserve them from the punishments imposed upon them by Nebuchadnezzar for failing to worship a huge golden statue he made (*Daniel 3*).

“Song of the Three Jews”
from an “apocryphal” part of *Daniel:3.52-87*

- 52“Blessed are you, O Lord, the God of our ancestors,
praiseworthy and exalted above all forever;
And blessed is your holy and glorious name,
praiseworthy and exalted above all for all ages.
- 53Blessed are you in the temple of your holy glory,
praiseworthy and glorious above all forever.
- 54Blessed are you on the throne of your kingdom,
praiseworthy and exalted above all forever.
- 55Blessed are you who look into the depths
from your throne upon the cherubim,
praiseworthy and exalted above all forever.
- 56Blessed are you in the firmament of heaven,
praiseworthy and glorious forever.
- 57Bless the Lord, all you works of the Lord,
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 58Angels of the Lord, bless the Lord,
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 59You heavens, bless the Lord,
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 60All you waters above the heavens, bless the Lord,
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 61All you powers, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 62Sun and moon, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 63Stars of heaven, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 64Every shower and dew, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.


- 65 All you winds, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 66 Fire and heat, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 67 Cold and chill, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 68 Dew and rain, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 69 Frost and chill, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 70 Hoarfrost and snow, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 71 Nights and days, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 72 Light and darkness, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 73 Lightnings and clouds, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 74 Let the earth bless the Lord,
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 75 Mountains and hills, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 76 Everything growing on earth, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 77 You springs, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 78 Seas and rivers, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 79 You sea monsters and all water creatures, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 80 All you birds of the air, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 81 All you beasts, wild and tame, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 82 All you mortals, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 83 O Israel, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 84 Priests of the Lord, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 85 Servants of the Lord, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 86 Spirits and souls of the just, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.
- 87 Holy and humble of heart, bless the Lord;
praise and exalt him above all forever.

The “everything created” of which they sing is ordered from the outside in, as in *Genesis*, from the celestial world to our globe within it, and the phenomena of this world presented in a saliently objective way; next to the animals, and to that subset of animals called man, but finally to those men who fear God, for instance the sort of men that Schadrach, Meshach and Abednego hope God will remember at just this moment, and even the departed spirits they may become.

Next I present two classification schemes invented at roughly the same time, for the shelving of books in a library: the categories of Melvil Dewey, and those of the Library of Congress. You can see immediately that while comprehensive they are intended to classify books, not the subjects about which books are written:

The Nine Categories of Melvil Dewey

“A classification and subject index, for cataloguing and arranging the books and pamphlets of a library,” (1876), a facsimile from the personal library of Joseph C. Rowell, the Great Librarian of UC Berkeley. See further, <https://www.kcu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Dewey-decimal-system-breakdown.pdf>



U.S. Library of Congress (c.1900)

(see further, <https://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpsol/lcco/>).

A	General Works (Encyclopedias, Periodicals, Yearbooks, Etc.)
B	Philosophy, Psychology, Religion
C	Auxiliary Sciences of History (Diplomatic, Numismatic, Archeologic, Etc.)
D	World History and History of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Etc.
E	History of the Americas (American National)
F	History of the Americas (American Local, Brit.-, Dutch-, French-, Latin America)
G	Geography, Anthropology, Recreation
H	Social Sciences
J	Political Science
K	Law
L	Education
M	Music and Books on Music
N	Fine Arts
P	Language and Literature
Q	Science
R	Medicine
S	Agriculture
T	Technology
U	Military Science
V	Naval Science
Z	Bibliography, Library Science, Information Resources (General)

This collection of Classifications is of course neither systematic nor complete, but is meant to show the variegation resulting according to the various interests of the various classifiers: In Aristotle's case, his interest for the sake of all he will say and write, in the range of predications available to *logos*; for Andronicus the interest is in organizing philosophy as an area of study now that it is over; for the Three Jews it's an expression of homage that morphs into calling God's attention to themselves; and for Dewey and the L-C it is entirely a matter of shelving books.

Roget's need however was far less systematic or pointed than these: he just wanted places in which to hang all the hats -- perhaps better, pigeon-holes into which to jam all the words we use! And yet we can see that his intuition is informed by the tradition. Here is his original table of six Classes with 42 Sections embracing 1000 pigeon holes:

ROGET'S ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION (1852)

Class	Section	Nos.
I. ABSTRACT RELATIONS	I. EXISTENCE	1 to 8
	II. RELATION	9— 24
	III. QUANTITY	25— 57
	IV. ORDER	58— 83
	V. NUMBER	84— 105
	VI. TIME	106— 139
	VII. CHANGE	140— 152
	VIII. CAUSATION	153— 179
II. SPACE.....	I. GENERALLY	180— 191
	II. DIMENSIONS	192— 239
	III. FORM	240— 263
	IV. MOTION	264— 315
III. MATTER.....	I. GENERALLY	316— 320
	II. INORGANIC	321— 356
	III. ORGANIC	357— 449
IV. INTELLECT.....	Division	
	(I.) FORMATION OF IDEAS	450— 515
V. VOLITION.....	(II.) COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS	516— 599
	(I.) INDIVIDUAL	600— 736
VI. AFFECTIONS.....	(II.) INTERSOCIAL	737— 819
	Section	
	I. GENERALLY	820— 826
	II. PERSONAL	827— 887
	III. SYMPATHETIC	888— 921
IV. MORAL	922— 975	
	V. RELIGIOUS	976—1000

It is not so far from Andronicus's organization of Aristotle into Logic, Physics (i.e., Nature), and Ethics, if we see Ethics as the world of Human Activity. I note also that Roget's division of the human into Reason, Volition, and Affections – which seems not to be derived from immediate predecessors – was just the way Plato saw man, in his tripartition of the soul into reason, will, and emotion. Great minds work together. Roget's division is perfectly serviceable - - not for the Stoic reasons that underlie the triad Logic, Physics, and Ethics, but because for Roget the purpose of the whole thing was to enable men to speak and write.

From the Introduction to his first edition we immediately learn that his whole endeavor is empirical. He describes empirically, rather than systematically, both the problem of recalling the right word and the solution for finding it that his *Thesaurus* is offering: As he observes, while “trains of ideas are passing through the mind” we often “lack the word and seek it in vain from the phraseology we have at hand;” “it cannot be conjured up at will;” it must be raised up as a “sprit from the vasty deep;” and worst, if we fail to find the word we need, “prolonged exertion will lead to a style labored as well as obscure, vapid and redundant, and at worst vague and ambiguous.” His sense of the solution is likewise empirical and pragmatic rather than relying on a system: by providing a man stuck on a word with “a variegated selection of words that express one way or another the idea one has in mind to express;” “if the selection be sufficiently abundant, an instinctive tact will rarely fail to lead him to the right choice;” “some felicitous expression among the group will open a whole vista of expression;” “some striking similitude or appropriate image, some excursive flight or brilliant conception may flash on the mind.”

His repetition of “some” in these several excerpts places beyond any doubt that he is not a systematizer like Andronicus of Rhodes; moreover, his notion of something flashing on the

mind recalls nothing more strongly for me than Plato's description of how an idea might be recollected from the previous life in the course of one tuning his mind with careful thought or discussion. Also implied by all these remarks is his practical sense of "any which way you can," rather than system; the same way that in Plato the definition of "man" in one context might be "rational animal" but in another "featherless biped."

So the book consists of 1000 Keywords or Ideas that are broken into the 42 subcategories of the six main Classes shown in the table above. As to the 1000 Key Ideas, Roget was careful to explain that Ideas have their Correlate Ideas – as Left to Right, or Past to Future; that some of the correlations were contraries, like the ones I have just given, but other Ideas have only a contradictory: as Reason to Unreason, Something to Nothing; and still others have two correlates as Light to Dark but also Light to Dim. Dim indeed might be a middle term between them, but its tendency is to refer to something that is not bright enough, not something that is not dark enough, and so it is a bit more a contrary than a medial term. On the other hand, between Large and Small there is Medium, completely neutral in its relation to both. To depict these correlations Roget invented a two-column arrangement so that correlates could be seen synoptically, side by side, the more to facilitate an idea popping into one's mind.

Here is a sample page -- it looks like this:

98—103	ABSTRACT RELATIONS	I. v. 3°	I. VI. 1°	NUMBER—TIME	102—107
<p>hundred, centenary, hecatomb, century; hundredweight, cwt.; one hundred and forty-four, gross; bicentenary, tercentenary &c. thousand, chiliad; myriad, millennium, ten thousand; lac, lakh, one hundred thousand, plum; million; thousand million, <i>milliard</i>. billion, trillion &c.</p> <p>V. centuriate.</p> <p>Adj. five, quinary, quintuple; fifth; senary, sextuple; sixth; seventh; octuple; eighth; ninefold, ninth; tenfold, decimal, denary, decuple, tenth; eleventh; duo-denary, -denal; twelfth; in one's 'teens, thirteenth.</p> <p>vices-, vigesimal; twentieth; twenty-fourth &c. <i>n.</i></p> <p>cent-uple, -uplicate, -ennial, -enary, -urial; secular, hundredth; thousandth; millenary &c.</p>	<p>3°. INDETERMINATE NUMBER</p> <p>100. [More than one.] Plurality.—N. plurality; a -number, - certain number; one or two, two or three &c.; a few, several; multitude &c. 102.</p> <p>Adj. plural, more than one, upwards of, some, certain; not -alone &c. 87.</p> <p>Adv. <i>et cetera</i>, &c., alone.</p> <p>Phr. <i>non deficit alter</i>.</p>	<p>100a. [Less than one.] Fraction.—N. fraction, fractional part, fragment; part &c. 51.</p> <p>Adj. fractional, fragmentary, partial.</p>	<p>the sea-shore, - hairs on the head; and -what not, - heaven knows what; endless &c. (<i>infinite</i>) 105.</p> <p>Phr. their name is 'Legion.'</p>	<p>104. Repetition.—N. repetition, iteration, reiteration, duplication, ding-dong, alliteration; <i>epistrophe</i>; harping, recurrence, succession, run; batto-, tauto-logy; monotony, tautophony; rhythm &c. 138; pleonasm, redundancy, diffuseness.</p> <p>chimes, repetend, echo, <i>ritornello</i>, burden of a song, <i>refrain</i>; rehearsal; encore; <i>réchauffé</i>, <i>refacimento</i>, recapitulation.</p> <p>cuckoo &c. (<i>imitation</i>) 19; reverberation &c. 408; drumming &c. (<i>roll</i>) 407; renewal &c. (<i>restoration</i>) 660.</p> <p>twice-told tale; old -story, - song, chestnut; second -, new- edition; reprint, new impression; return game, return match, reappearance, reproduction; periodicity &c. 138.</p> <p>V. repeat, iterate, reiterate, reproduce, parrot, echo, re-echo, drum, harp upon, battologize, hammer, redouble.</p> <p>recur, revert, return, reappear; renew &c. (<i>restore</i>) 660.</p> <p>rehearse; do -, say- over again; ring the changes on; harp on the same string; din -, drum- in the ear; conjugate in all its moods, tenses and inflexions, begin again, go over the same ground, go the same round, never hear the last of; resume, return to, recapitulate, reword.</p> <p>Adj. repeated &c. <i>v.</i>; repetition-al, -ary; recur-rent, -ring; ever recurring, thick coming; frequent, incessant, redundant, pleonastic, tautological.</p> <p>monotonous, harping, iterative; mocking, chiming; retold; aforesaid, -named; above-mentioned, said; habitual &c. 613; another.</p> <p>Adv. repeatedly, often, again, afresh, anew, over again, once more; ditto, <i>encore</i>, <i>de novo</i>, <i>bis</i>, <i>da capo</i>.</p> <p>again and again; over and over, - again; many times over; time- and again, - after time; year after year; day by day &c.; many -, several -, a number of- times; many -, full many- a time; times out of number, year in and year out, morning, noon and night; frequently &c. 136.</p> <p>Phr. <i>ecce iterum Crispinus, toujours perdrix</i>, cut and come again; 'tomorrow and tomorrow.'</p>	<p>105. Infinity.—N. infini-ty, -tude, -teness &c. <i>adj.</i>; perpetuity &c. 112.</p> <p>V. be -infinite &c. <i>adj.</i>; know -, have- no -limits, - bounds; go on for ever.</p> <p>Adj. infinite; immense; number-, count-, sum-, measure-less; in- numer-, immeasur-, in-calcul-, illimit-, intermin-, unfathom-, unap- proach-able; exhaustless, inexhaustible, indefinite; without -number, -measure, -limit, -end; incomprehensible; limit-, end-, bound-, term- less; un-told, -numbered, -measured, -bounded, -limited; illimited; perpetual &c. 112.</p> <p>Adv. infinitely &c. <i>adj.</i>; <i>ad infinitum</i>.</p>
<p>101. Zero.—N. zero, nothing naught, nought, duck's egg, goose egg; cipher, none, nobody; not a soul; <i>âme qui vit</i>; absence &c. 187; unsubstanti- ality &c. 4.</p> <p>Adj. not -one, - any.</p>	<p>103. Fewness.—N. fewness &c. <i>adj.</i>; paucity, small number; small quantity &c. 32; scarcity, sparsity; rarity; in- frequency &c. 137; handful; maniple; minority, exiguity.</p> <p>[Diminution of number] reduction; weeding &c. <i>v.</i>; elimination, sarcula- tion, decimation.</p> <p>V. be -few &c. <i>adj.</i></p> <p>render -few &c. <i>adj.</i>; reduce, dimin- ish the number, weed, eliminate, thin, decimate.</p> <p>Adj. few; scarce; scant, -y; thin, rare, thinly scattered, few and far between; exiguous; infrequent &c. 137; <i>rari nantes</i>; hardly -, scarcely- any; to be counted on one's fingers; reduced &c. <i>v.</i>; unrepeated.</p> <p>Adv. here and there.</p>	<p>107. Neverness.*—N. 'neverness' period, term, stage, space, span, spell, absence of time, no time; <i>dies no- Tib's eve</i>; Greek Kalends.</p> <p>Adv. never; at no -time, - perio-</p>	<p>SECTION VI. TIME</p> <p>1°. ABSOLUTE TIME</p>	<p>106. Time.—N. time, duration;</p>	
<p>102. Multitude.—N. multitude; numerousness &c. <i>adj.</i>; numer-osity, -ality; multiplicity; profusion &c. (<i>plenty</i>) 639; legion, host; great -, large -, round -, enormous -number; a quantity, numbers, array, sight, army, sea, galaxy; scores, peck, bushel, school, shoal, swarm, draft, bevy, cloud, flock, herd, drove, flight, covey, hive, brood, litter, farrow, fry, nest; mob, crowd &c. (<i>assemblage</i>) 72; lots, loads, heaps; all the world and his wife.</p> <p>[Increase of number] greater number, majority; multiplication, multiple.</p> <p>V. be -numerous &c. <i>adj.</i>; swarm -, teem -, crawl -, creep -with; crowd, swarm, come thick upon; outnumber, multiply; people; swarm like -locusts, - bees; be alive with.</p> <p>Adj. many, several, sundry, divers, various, not a few; a -hundred, - thousand, - myriad, - million, - thousand and one; some -ten or a dozen, - forty or fifty &c.; half a -dozen, - hundred &c.; very -, full -, ever so -many; numer-ous, -ose; profuse, in profusion; manifold, multiplied, multi- tudinous, multiferous, multiple, multinomial, teeming, crawling, populous, peopled, crowded, thick, studded; galore.</p> <p>thick coming, many more, more than one can tell, a world of; no end -of, - to; <i>cum multis aliis</i>; thick as -hops, - hail; plenty as blackberries; numerous as the -stars in the firmament, - sands on</p>	<p>[34]</p>	<p>* A term introduced by Bishop Wilkins.</p>			

At the top of the page you are reminded which Class you are in and which Section of that Class, both by number (top left) and by name (top center), with Idea-number on the right. About the Ideas presented in the sample, the first thing to notice is that there are more terms gathered under MULTITUDE than under its correlate: the horizontal line in the right column, under “**Adv.** here and there,” indicates that the entry under FEWNESS is complete and now allows the continuation of the left column to burgeon rightward, for the economy of pages. The entry under MULTITUDE continues onto the next page and ends with “**Phr.** his name is ‘Legion.’ ”

And next comes entry 104, REPETITION. The entry occupies the center of the page: the two column arrangement is suspended – because REPETITION is being conceived as a medial term between MULTITUDE and FEWNESS, in the sense that yes, the repetition makes a greater number but the repeated thing is the same, so that in another sense it is not a plurality. This is a good example of the looseness, and comprehensive reach, of Roget’s idea of correlate ideas.

Going back to entries 102 and 103, notice that the words are grouped according to part of speech: Always the noun first (indeed the lead Idea is treated as a noun); then comes the verb – the other major part of speech – and then the adjective that goes with the noun and the adverb that goes with the verb. And there is one more category, seen at the end of 103: the **Phrase**. It is another stroke of Roget’s genius to include phrases: it is an index of their accuracy to the idea that they that stick in the mind and stick around in the language. Here we have the example “his name is ‘Legion’ ” from the Bible. But note also that at the end of 103, under **adverb**, FEWNESS can be expressed by “here and there,” which is no less a phrase, but an adverbial phrase (telling where).

Now if you look within the paragraphs collecting words under the headings you will notice the words collected and entered are separated by commas if closer in meaning and semicolons if further. Notice also the space-saving method of using hyphens and dashes.

These are the structural elements of the pigeonhole frames. But now look at what is stuffed into them, into the paragraphs. For Multitude the first words are, yes, quantitative synonyms (We are after all in the Section called “Number,” the fifth Section within the first Class, Abstract Relations). But then immediately we have more qualitative terms for multitude – since multitude itself as an idea has natural implications – such as “enormous” and “army” and “score” (you can readily supply sentences in which those words stand for a multitude, one way or another). Go on and you will see what Roget meant in the Introduction, saying, in the passage quoted above, that he must supply a selection “variegated” and “abundant.”

I wish to stress above all else that the pigeon-holing structure is quite different in spirit from the selecting of items to be crammed, as I have been saying, into the pigeon holes. Once Roget reaches one of the thousand ideas by the genius of his systematic Classification, refined by his pairing with Correlates, he throws all system to the wind and wakens another genius, lively and a little wild, that finds all sorts of things to put in the pigeon holes. His brilliant organization is in service of this brilliantly disorganized final step, which is really the heart of the book. The manner of the entries into the pigeon holes have special powers.

First, variegation will spur the mind. Have a look at entry 182 PLACE (i.e., Limited Space):

182. [Limited space.] **Place.**—**N.** place, lieu, spot, point, dot; niche, nook, &c. (*corner*) 244; hole; pigeon-hole &c. (*receptacle*) 191; compartment; premises, precinct, station, confine; area, court, yard, court-yard, quadrangle, square, compound; abode &c. 189; locality &c. (*situation*) 183.
 ins and outs; every hole and corner.
Adv. somewhere, in some place, wherever it may be, here and there, in various places, *pazzim*.

We are at the beginning of the Second of Six Classes, which is SPACE. He begins with the correlated pair SPACE – REGION: that is, indefinite space (on the left) versus definite space (on the right). Here, below REGION in the right column -- the “definite” column – we meet a notion similar to REGION, namely, LIMITED SPACE. It is a second correlate to SPACE. The words he puts into the pigeon hole are wonderfully varied “place, lieu, spot, point, dot; niche...” Have a look.

A second characteristic of the manner of stuffing is that illogical connections are tolerated. So, in 19 IMITATION and its correlate 20 NON-IMITATION, which appear under the ABSTRACT RELATION of “RELATION, type 3” (which is “Partial Relation” – think of two things being *similar*), we soon come to the pair IMITATION and NON-IMITATION. But look under IMITATION: it includes transcription and copy, but also simulation and forgery! Those terms are hardly friendly with each other but both have a claim to be included under IMITATION. Similarly, look at 80 RULE, whose correlate is 81 MULTIFORMITY:

5°. ORDER AS REGARDS CATEGORIES

80. Rule.—**N.** regularity, uniformity &c. 16; clock-work precision; punctuality &c. (*exactness*) 494; routine &c. (*custom*) 613; formula; system; rut; canon, convention, maxim; rule &c. (*form, regulation*) 697; key-note, standard, model; precedent &c. (*prototype*) 22; conformity &c. 82.

nature, principle; law; order of things; normal –, natural –, ordinary –, model- state, – condition; standing –dish, – order; normality; Procrustean law; law of the Medes and Persians; hard and fast rule.

Adj. regular, uniform, symmetrical, constant, steady; according to rule &c. (*conformable*) 82; customary &c. 613; orderly &c. 58.

81. Multiformity.—**N.** multi-, omniformity; variety, diversity; multifariousness &c. *adj.*

Adj. multi-form, -fold, -farious, -generous; multiplex, variform, manifold, many-sided, multiplicate; omni-form, -genous, -farious; polymorphic; protean; heterogeneous, motley, mosaic; epicene, indiscriminate, desultory, irregular, diversified, different, divers; all manner of; of -every description, – all sorts and kinds; *et hoc genus omne*; and what not? *de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*.

Under RULE we find the happy terms “clock-work precision” and “maxim;” but also “Procrustean Law” and (from *Daniel*) “the law of Medes and Persians.” Read also for your enjoyment the farrago of adjectives on the right, under 81 MULTIFORMITY, finally including “and what not?”

Third, the loose logic of the packing also aids translators, as Roget predicted in his Introduction. I have an example to share. I have just translated a book on Plato written by a very fine Plato scholar retired from the Sorbonne. She loves to use the word *permettre* in a logical sense, meaning that one idea can permit another, in the sense that if the first is true or valid, then the second is true or valid. The problem is, the etymological equivalent in English, namely, “permit” fixes itself into my mind right away and I cannot see past it to find an appropriate term.

Roget loosens me up in a funny way. I look under “permit” in Roget’s Index at the back, and it takes me to paragraph 760 (VOLITION > Special Intersocial Volition > Permission):

Section II. SPECIAL INTERSOCIAL VOLITION

760. Permission.—**N.** permission, leave; allow-, suffer-ance; toler-ance, -ation; liberty, law, license, concession, grace; indulgence &c. (*lenity*) 740; favour, dispensation, exemption, release; connivance; vouchsafement. authorization, warranty, accordance, admission. permit, warrant, *brevet*, precept, sanction, authority, *firman*; pass, -port; furlough, licence, *carte blanche*, ticket of leave; grant, charter, patent.

V. permit; give -permission &c. *n.*, - power; let, allow, admit; suffer, bear with, tolerate, recognize; concede &c. 762; accord, vouchsafe, favour, /humour, gratify, indulge, stretch a point; wink at, connive at; shut one’s eyes to. grant, empower, charter, enfranchise, privilege, confer a privilege, license, authorize, warrant; sanction; entrust &c. (*commission*) 755. give -*carte blanche*, - the reins to, - scope to &c. (*freedom*) 748; leave -alone, - it to one, - the door open; open the -door to, - floodgates; give a loose to. let off; absolve &c. (*acquit*) 970; release, exonerate, dispense with. ask -, beg -, request- -leave, - permission.

Adj. permitting &c. *v.*; permissive, indulgent; permitted &c. *v.*; patent, chartered, permissible, allowable, lawful, legitimate, legal; legalized &c. (*law*) 963; licit; unforbid, -den; unconditional.

Adv. permissibly; by -, with -, on- -leave &c. *n.*; *speciali gratiâ*; under favour of; *pace*; *ad libitum* &c. (*freely*) 748, (*at will*) 600; by all means &c. (*willingly*) 602; yes &c. (*assent*) 488.

761. Prohibition.—**N.** pro-, in-hibition; *velo*, disallowance; interdict, -ion; injunction; embargo, ban, *verboten*, taboo, proscription; *index expurgatorius*; restriction &c. (*restraint*) 751; hindrance &c. 706; forbidden fruit.

V. pro-, in-hibit; forbid, put one’s *velo* upon, disallow; bar; debar &c. (*hinder*) 706, forefend. keep -in, - within bounds; restrain &c. 751; cohibit, withhold, limit, circumscribe, clip the wings of, restrict, narrow; interdict, taboo; put -, place-under -an interdiction, - the ban; proscribe, censor; exclude, shut out; shut -, bolt -, show- the door; warn off; dash the cup from one’s lips; forbid the banns.

Adj. prohibit-ive, -ory; interdictive; proscriptive; restrictive, exclusive; forbidding &c. *v.* prohibited &c. *v.*; not -permitted &c. 760; unlicensed, contraband, under the ban of; illegal &c. 964; unauthorized, not to be thought of.

Adv. on no account &c. (*no*) 536.

Int. forbid it heaven! &c. (*deprecation*) 766. hands -, keep- off! hold! stop! avast!

Phr. that will never do.

Even though the Idea Roget is talking about is within the world of volition (rather than logic, where my question lies), the words he places here give me some leeway (*permit me!*) for getting rid of “permit” and thinking in the direction of “leaving the door open” – and I translate “gives way for.”

Fourth, the easy and often humorous manner of including Phrases, with a light touch (whether listed under parts of speech or as Phrases) that catch the idea in its very expression! One of my favorites comes in the triad of articles on the correlates 13 IDENTITY and 14 CONTRARIETY and their medial term, 15 DIFFERENCE. The medial term gets the phrase “moods and tenses,” an ever so accurate and felicitous way of expressing the nuance of medial “difference,” as a student of the Sequence of Moods in Greek and the Sequences of Tenses in Latin will immediately see. It is curious and a little funny that under 34 RELATIVE QUANTITY, we get the phrase *mene tekal* – since that judgment was *absolute*, but the cause of the judgment is falling short *relative* to a standard. The easy and often humorous manner of including Phrases with a light touch (whether listed under parts of speech or as Phrases) catch the idea in its very expression! Under 155 ATTRIBUTION (i.e., of cause) he quotes *hinc illae lachrymae* (from

Terence quoted then by Horace and others: “so that’s where those tears came from”), and right next to that slightly erudite expression, he puts the most notorious of attributions: “*cherchez la femme*”! Finally, my favorite comes under 563 NEOLOGISM, the correlate of 562 WORD (Immediately it becomes clear that by NEOLOGISM Roget is referring to the irresponsible coining of words out of laziness or ignorance: in his Introduction he announced he felt no incumbency to include such words in the *Thesaurus*, but that is another thing from including the word that characterizes them!):

<p>562. Word.—N. word, term, vocable; name &c. 564; phrase &c. 566; root, etymon; derivative; part of speech &c. (<i>grammar</i>) 567. dictionary, vocabulary, word book, lexicon, index, glossary, thesaurus, <i>gradus</i>, <i>delectus</i>, concordance. etymology, lexicology, derivation; phonology, orthoepy; gloss-, termin-, orism-ology; paleology &c. (<i>philology</i>) 560; comparative philology. lexicograph-er, -y; glossographer &c. (<i>scholar</i>) 492; etymologist; logolept. verbosity, verbiage, loquacity &c. 584. Adj. verbal, literal; titular, nominal. [Similarly derived] conjugate, paronymous; derivative. Adv. verbally &c. <i>adj.</i>; <i>verbatim</i> &c. (<i>exactly</i>) 494.</p>	<p>563. Neology.—N. neolo-gy, -gism; new-fangled expression; barbarism; cacronym; archaism, black letter, monkish Latin; corruption; missaying, antiphrasis. <i>paronomasia</i>, play upon words; word-play &c. (<i>wit</i>) 842; pun; <i>double-entendre</i> &c. (<i>ambiguity</i>) 520; palindrome, paragram, clinch; abuse of -language, - terms. dialect, brogue, <i>patois</i>, provincialism, broken English, <i>lingua franca</i>; Brit-, Gall-, Scott-, Hibern-icism; Americanism; Gipsy lingo, Romany, pidgin English. dog Latin, macaronics, gibberish, confusion of tongues, Babel; jargon. colloquialism &c. (<i>figure of speech</i>) 521; by-word; technicality, lingo, slang, cant, <i>argot</i>, St. Giles's Greek, thieves' Latin, peddler's French, flash tongue, Billingsgate, Wall Street slang. pseudonym &c. (<i>misnomer</i>) 565; Mr. So-and-so; what d'ye call 'em, what's his name; N. N.; <i>Monsieur Un Tel</i>; thingum-my, -bob; gadget, dooflicker, do-funny, <i>oo-ja-ka-pi-vi</i>; <i>je ne sais quoi</i>. neologist, coiner of words. V. coin words. Adj. neologic, -al; rare; archaic; obsolete &c. (<i>old</i>) 124; colloquial, dialectic, slang, cant. Phr. <i>Il a passé par Marseille.</i></p>
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Look at the phrase with which he finishes up the entry on NEOLOGISM: “*il a passé par Marseille.*” I can’t wait to use it. It reminds me of the clever rejoinder, “You must be new in town.”


Finally, in this consideration of looseness and suggestiveness and his light touch, I should note that Roget eschews *nomenclature*, those words in our vocabulary that have no “neighbors” and in a sense “mean” nothing but only *denote*, like proper names – unless of course it is the “eagle” among birds with its rich associations; or the “plane” tree among trees. Conversely – and every statement about Roget gets an equally true converse! -- in the cases of 225 INVESTMENT (meaning putting on clothing: he chooses this word in order to set up its correlate, 226 DIVESTMENT, meaning taking clothes off), he lists many articles of clothing; and similarly under 298 EATING many foods – since these items, so intimate to our daily regime, have accrued many metaphorical overtones.

In summary, we find illogic, association, indirection, distraction. It all makes me think of another topic, and another method, the ancient art of memory (*Ars Memoriae*), whereby you remember someone’s name by adding an association, by adding mediation – e.g., “river” or a fisherman, to remember “Bridgewater.” Cicero told his students to memorize their orations by imagining a house with a vestibule, a lobby, hallways staircases and rooms. In fact thinking of this might suggest that our problem, when we get stuck, is that we need mediation: We are grasping the word that we know is wrong too tightly – for we are attached to the idea that itself has no

name, or many names, and we mustn't lose it altogether; but as long as we think that wrong word how can we jump over to another? If somehow we could loosen our grip we might find a better word to take hold of, and this is what Roget has made available to us by gathering neighboring words. So now, on the horizon we see a connection to the literary devices of metonymy and metaphor, and understand something of the thrill when we are reading a writer that employs them, and why we take particular joy in making such leaps right along with him.

I invite you to browse on your own through Roget with some initial guidance from these reflections upon its structure and powers. Unfortunately many of the features of his original design and format have been revised or abandoned in subsequent American editions, always for the worse -- and though our own intimate intercourse with Roget has stayed close to his original conception, it is such abusive departures from his conception that I refer to in my title when I say that Roget has been "rogered." I must consign this sad history to an Appendix, for I wish to close with something much finer -- indeed with the highest praise I think I can accord to a fellow human being, by telling you about Roget's *Bridgewater Treatise* along with an anecdote about an event involving Bishop Wilberforce, Thomas Huxley, and Darwin that took place at Oxford when Roget was 80 years old. He was there.

In the 1830's the man Francis Henry Egerton, who was to be the last Earl of Bridgewater, left in his will a provision for eight authors to be paid to compose and publish works evincing the presence of Divine Design in any or all areas of the Creation. The President of the Royal Society nominated Roget among others. Here is a list of the authors and titles they produced, taken from the third edition of Roget's own publication:



Roget imposed upon himself the task of complementing the work of the others by illustrating the theme of Divine Design in the remaining areas of Plant and Animal Physiology. In his Preface (3rd ed., pp.x-xi) he states candidly and without apology that he has excluded from his treatise all those particulars of Plant and Animal Physiology “of which the relation to final causes cannot be distinctly traced”; and that he has “admitted only such facts as afford manifest evidences of design.” Scientific, but partial! And as such the field called Natural Theology, represented saliently by William Paley and his work of that title published in 1803, would be subject to criticism in an ever more enlightened age, especially by the time of the Great Debate that took place at Oxford in 1860, about which is the anecdote I mentioned above.

A certain J.W. Draper, at the Great Debate over the theory of Darwin held there on June 30, 1860, defended that theory before a large and mixed audience. Spurred by several in the audience who cried out their objections, Bishop Wilberforce of Oxford rose on the podium and asked Thomas Huxley, “Darwin’s Bulldog,” also seated there, in the hearing of the general audience, whether he traced his ancestry to the monkey through his mother’s side or his father’s. Huxley’s retort to Wilberforce was more penetratingly *ad hominem* (if indeed it means anything to say *homo* in this context), namely:

If there were an ancestor whom I should feel shame in recalling it would rather be a man – a man of restless and versatile intellect – who, not content with an equivocal success in his own sphere of activity, plunges into scientific questions with which he has no real acquaintance.

I have to comment that whereas Wilberforce was reminding Huxley of calling *himself* an ape, Huxley’s rude retort proved he was no less an animal than man by accusing Wilberforce of a sin only a man could conceive of, and only another man could commit. But so goes the debate: on the one side the type of the empirical scientist, humbled or humiliated by the method he has adopted, confined to the meagre facts it vouchsafes him to know, taking no responsibility for his beliefs by referring to them as what a certain “we” believe, by dint of sharing a method and a protocol, and devolving thereby into the humble posture of the reasonable sceptic or else to striking the pose of the indifferent realist. On the other side we have the type who wants to exceed these others in righteousness, like the Wm. Jennings Bryan figure in the 1955 play, *Inherit the Wind*, playing to a crowd of the perhaps pious and well-meaning but the surely ignorant – an imitation giant among real pygmies, according to the Sanskrit sloka.

What is characteristically left out in this debate, is the most important point, a point that Roget, to his credit, devotes his final paragraphs of his thousand page treatise to teach us, which I would now quote *in extenso*:

The Great Author of our being, who, while he has been pleased to confer on us the gift of reason has prescribed certain limits to its powers, permits us to acquire, by its exercise, a knowledge of some of the wondrous works of his creation; to interpret the characters of wisdom and of goodness with which they are impressed; and to join our voice to the general chorus which proclaims “His Might, Majesty, and Dominion.” From the same gracious hand we also derive that unquenchable thirst for knowledge, which this fleeting life must ever leave unsatisfied; those endowments of the moral sense, with which the present constitution of the world so

ill accords; and that innate desire of perfection which our present frail condition is so inadequate to fulfil. But it is not given to man to penetrate into the counsels or fathom the designs of Omnipotence; for in directing his views into futurity, the feeble light of his reason is scattered and lost in the vast abyss. Although we plainly discern intention in every part of the creation, the grand object of the whole is placed far above the scope of our comprehension. It is impossible, however, to conceive that this enormous expenditure of power, this vast accumulation of contrivances and of machinery, and this profusion of existence resulting from them can thus, from age to age, be prodigally lavished without some ulterior end. Is Man, the favored creature of nature's bounty, "the paragon of animals," whose spirit holds communion with celestial powers, formed but to perish with the wreck of his bodily frame? Are generations after generations of his race doomed to follow in endless succession, rolling darkly down the stream of time, and leaving no track in its pathless ocean? Are the operations of Almighty power to end with the present scene? May we not discern, in the spiritual constitution of man the traces of higher powers, to which those he now possesses are but preparatory; some embryo faculties which raise us above this earthly habitation? Have we not in the imagination, a power but little in harmony with the fetters of our bodily organs; and bringing within our view purer conditions of being exempt from the illusions of our senses and the infirmities of our nature, our elevation to which will eventually prove that all these unsated desires of knowledge and all these ardent aspirations after moral good, were not implanted in us in vain?

Happily there has been vouchsafed to us from a higher source, a pure and heavenly light to guide our faltering steps, and animate our fainting spirit, in this dark and dreary search; revealing those truths which it imports us most of all to know; giving to morality higher sanctions; elevating our hopes and our affections to nobler objects than belong to earth, and inspiring more exalted themes of thanksgiving and of praise.

Rather than being embarrassed for embracing what he knows only by faith, Roget expresses his thanks to God for being given the desire to know and for his ability to know what he does and what it indicates to him. His imperfection, he believes, is part of God's providential creation, rather than a reason not to believe there is an answer: his weakness that is, is his strength. It is rather an evidence of a perfection of which he already has an inkling as if through a glass darkly. He takes his own experience of being in between knowledge and ignorance as a gift of God rather than a ground for despondency on the one hand, or rebellion on the other. It is the credo one embraces as an I, not a "we" like the scientist. Such a person thrives in the unknown, intuiting the tendencies, feeling the gentle pull, expecting no more, and he always says "On we go," like our fellow chit-chatter, Charles Sullivan.

It is exactly this experience of an ignorance with an orientation that Aristotle and Plato and Socrates, meant by "philosophy," having as they did no better term at their place and time. But about them in some future Essay for our venerable Chit Chat Club –

I thank you for your attention.

APPENDIX: Roget's *Nachleben* in Subsequent Editions.

It remains for me to sketch the fate of Roget's work in the American editions of the 20th Century. The English editions, done with Longmans by his son and his grandson, were happily less eventful, retaining the spirit, the method, and the manner of the original, all of which on the whole was subsequently maintained by Robert Dutch (c.1950) when Longmans was bought by Penguin. In America, however, it is a story of steady decline. Early on, in 1879, the work was appropriated and promoted for an eager American public by the enterprising publisher, Thomas Crowell, who added "International" to its title to set his editions apart (starting in 1922), and issued three more revisions ("editions" as distinct from the several reprints between them), under three editors (Mawson; Berrey; Chapman). Harper Collins bought Crowell (in 1978), and again used Robert Chapman to prepare a fifth American edition (1992), who thanked his wife for her patience; and in the sixth, Chapman passed on the torch to Barbara Kipfer, Ph.D., who has continued through to the latest, eighth edition (2019) and thanked her cat and her husband.

Things begin well with Crowell's Second Edition, under Sylvester Mawson (1937), who reprints Roget's Introduction unaltered. He retains Roget's basic classification with its six Classes and forty-two Sections embracing 1000 Ideas (what I call pigeon holes). He retains the format of dual columns and the headings of Class and Section both by number and by name at the top of each page. Great care, Mawson tells us, was taken to add phrases from modern authors "felicitous and keen in prose and thought" – an expression deferentially reminiscent of Roget's. Mawson of course added many more words – especially scientific and "technical" (by which I think he means technological), and culled words by then obsolete. Finally, he added 54 pages at the end giving translations of the foreign terms and phrases used in the body of the work.

In the Third, however, under the editor Lester Berrey (1962), Roget's wonderful Introduction is suddenly, and permanently, dropped. Moreover, Roget's classification is altered, and to see how is rather difficult. Up until now the six Classes with their forty-two Sections could be viewed synoptically on a single page (I reproduced that page, above), and then followed a multipage charting of the 1000 Ideas contained in them, which Roget had called a "Tabular Synopsis of Categories," all of which was preserved by Mawson in the Second Edition. In the present edition, however, there is only the latter, a multipage charting. Working through that, we discover there are now eight Classes, forty-three Sections, and 1040 Ideas. But upon inspection, these changes retain Roget's overall structure as we explained it above in comparison with the Aristotelian Corpus: the changes consist largely of changes in rank of Roget's Ideas and Sections and Classes ("Physics" is now a Class added before Matter, and "Sensation" a Class after it; but Roget had basically included both those as Sections within the single Class, Matter, by making both Sensation as well as its Sensibilia aspects of Organic Matter [animals]).

Within the main body of the work, however, we immediately notice two things: the Two Column format has been dropped, so the reader is deprived of the experience of viewing the correlative terms synoptically; and within the entry for an Idea – a pigeon hole – what had been a series of paragraphs are now numbered "decimally" – in the sense of Melvil Dewey since as with his method any number of subsections can be accommodated. But the *sequencing* of the paragraphs within the pigeon hole is the same: first, paragraphs containing nouns, then verbs, then adjectives, then adverbs, then phrases. It must be said that the original ordering of the paragraphs by part of speech is of an order entirely different from and unrelated to the arithmetical ordering added by the decimal numbering; and that the latter is quite irrelevant to the structure of the

pigeon hole. What value it has is that in the Index at the back, a given paragraph within the pigeon hole can be pointed to (by the Idea Number plus the “decimal” paragraph number within the Idea’s pigeonhole) so that the reader is no longer faced with reading through the entire pigeon hole for words akin to his word. But this putatively economic improvement is entirely vitiated by Roget’s basic idea that the user needs an *abundance* and a *variety* of words that might suggest what he is looking for!

At the top of the page in this new edition there is only the Idea-number with its “decimal” supplement (Roget had put the Idea-number on the right top), but there is no reference to the Class and no reference to the Section, neither by number nor by name (which Roget provided on the left and in the center, respectively). The user is deprived of the rational perspective those indications provided, and thus is deprived of still another spur to his thought.

There is in this version a great expansion of nomenclature, in total disregard of Roget’s eschewal of it -- not only in areas of technological apparatus and physical science (e.g., 37 electrical units [e.g. ohm] are listed, 36 electronic meters, and a hundred “electronic devices”), but also 100 Nationalities and 1200 Animals, etc., etc. Phrases, on the other hand, which “now seem to be of limited usefulness,” are simply gone: under 154 ATTRIBUTION we have neither those *lachrymae*, nor the woman being pursued!

With the loss of the Phrases the book has lost its voice; with the loss of the column format and of headings on each page it has lost its visible logic; with the addition of extensive nomenclatures it has become centrifugal instead of centripetal; with its decimal convention it has become horizontal only instead of vertical also; and its reader is becoming more a *Beobachter* and less a *Teilnehmer*.

The Fourth edition, “revised” by Robert Chapman, reproduces all the shortcomings of the Third but makes explicit something of their motivation and cause. Chapman writes, in his Foreword, “Everything has been done to facilitate quick consultation [by which he means to be explaining the “decimal” numbering of the paragraphs], while at the same time each sense-group [pigeonhole] is developed to nearly its maximum range for those whose expressive or stylistic wishes require variation, or even strangeness.” Both those goals are corrupt in a writer, and both were resisted by Roget in his Introduction, now absent from the book -- and both by the way were motives imputed, by Roget’s first reviewers to the prospective users of his book as a basis for criticizing its existence: that it would enable hack writers to write hack. As to the former goal -- variation -- Roget told us there are no synonyms; as to the latter -- strangeness -- he resisted neologism as lazy or ignorant, and encouraged accuracy rather than vanity in language use, for the sake of keeping the language rational and strong.

Next, Harper Collins bought Crowell, and issued a Fifth edition, elevating Chapman from Reviser to Editor. Indeed, an engaging photograph of him is presented on the back flap. He has felt his oats, and he has seen fit to give Roget a good rogering by completely tossing out his Classification Scheme. It would be hard to improve upon quoting his explanation *ipsissimis verbis*, from his Foreword:

Dr. Roget wished, as he said in his original Introduction, “to obtain the greatest amount of practical utility.” That should be the aim of all lexicography. Hence he adopted principles of order which seemed “the simplest and most natural, and which would not require, either for their comprehension or application, any disciplined acumen, or depth of metaphysical or antiquarian lore.”

At this distance from his intellectual milieu, Roget's scheme no longer seems simple and natural. It reflects a Platonic view of the cosmos, combined with an Aristotelian marshaling of concepts. By "Platonic" I mean that he orders things as though abstract ideas exist in some supraterrrestrial [sic] realm, and are made temporal and physical as they descend to Earth. By "Aristotelian" I mean that he proceeds by strict logic.

However respectable this cosmos and its deployment may be philosophically, it does not coincide with the way most people now apprehend the universe. Casting about for a more fitting arrangement I chose what I call a "developmental-existential" scheme. The notion has been to make the arrangement analogous with the development of the human individual and the human race. It is more association and duration than logical. This seems to me "the simplest and most natural" array in the mind of our own time.

He presents Roget's criteria in the first paragraph; discovers in the second that our intellectual milieu has by 1992 moved away from a Platonic and Aristotelian one, explaining what he means by Platonic and Aristotelian; and then presents in his third paragraph an argument for a scheme that better meets Roget's own criteria because of our less "respectable" intellectual milieu.

The basic problem I see in his argument is that while Roget's Classification does indeed embody Aristotelian and Platonic characteristics in certain ways, as I happened to have mentioned above, those characteristics are not the same as the characteristics by which Chapman goes on to characterize Plato and Aristotle! What is Platonic in Roget's Classification is the tripartition of the human realm into Thought, Volition, and Affections (Classes IV, V, and VI), which corresponds to the Platonic tripartition of the soul; and what is Aristotelian is the ordering of the all six Classes in a way analogous to the Stoic categories used by Andronicus to categorize the works of Aristotle, namely, Logic (Class I, Abstract Relations), Physics (Class II, Space; Class III, Matter) and Ethics (Classes IV-VI, Thought Volition Affections) – with which incidentally Aristotle had nothing to do, but even Roget would not likely know that; and also the Categories or Predicables of Aristotle, that so closely resemble the Sections within Roget's first Class, Abstract Relations.

But there are things even more truly Aristotelian and more truly Platonic in Roget's own project than these, and they are the very contrary of what Chapman sees as characteristic of Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle, though he appears to be a systematic philosopher (what Chapman must mean with his exegetical "strict logic"), he did not arrange his "works" into a system (Andronicus did). Instead he gave courses of lectures that began with some realm of our existence, he looked at the items and consulted his predecessors' views, and adopted principles that arose from the phenomena. It was the very antithesis of systematicity, if we compare for example the later work of Descartes. And yet what is most engaging about Aristotle's many lecture courses is that they do hang together under a set of really basic concepts that bring them together, but do so only by loose analogy. It is his "hylo-morphism": the fruitful notion that things consist of matter and form. For words, the definitions consist of genus (matter) and specific differentia (form); sentences consist of the subject (matter) and the predicate (form); things in the world consist of matter stamped with form. And so on. But these avatars of matter and form are held together by homonymy not system: they function for Aristotle the same way the Classification functions for Roget: it provides places to provide for specific works in specific fields on a concrete level, and all the interest and all the falsifiability is inside the pigeon holes.

Conversely, what is more deeply Platonic about Roget's whole project is his recognition that we will recognize the word we are looking for when we see it. Please recall from the first pages of his Introduction I quoted above, these words: "if the selection of words I provide be sufficiently abundant, an *instinctive tact* will rarely fail to lead him to the right choice." And, "some felicitous expression among the group will *open a whole vista* of expression." And "some *striking similitude* or appropriate image, some *excursive flight* or *brilliant conception* may flash on the mind." All these "some's" as I said above, are empirical, not "aprioristic," and they describe with phenomenological accuracy the Platonic experience of anamnesis, recollection. For Plato they have to do with the experience of understanding something that can only be accounted for by assuming we already knew it, since it is neither the sum nor the inevitable inference from a congeries of specific experiences. Plato posited the forms because they made sense of the tugs he felt in his own mind: he wanted to continue thinking, and thinking that thinking was something real. He never insisted he knew anything, nor did the barefoot man that inspired him to write throughout his life this corpus of dialogues – namely, Socrates, who himself "knew nothing;" and Plato's dialogues also prove nothing but find meaning in the occasions of people casually but sincerely and seriously talking with each other. He was an "occasionalist," as was Roget as I have hoped to show in my main lecture.

But Chapman does not know about Plato and Aristotle: Plato was not a platonist, nor was Aristotle's logic any stricter than logic: these characterizations are for him only the straw men of an sciolistic linguist which he tries to employ as foil for his own outlook, which he dubs "developmental-existential," for no obvious reason. Have a look yourself at Chapman's new Fifteen Classes replacing Roget's six -- they are the sort of thing that gives a dog's breakfast a bad name but nevertheless have been retained up to the current Eighth edition of 2019.

THE BODY AND THE SENSES
FEELINGS
PLACE AND CHANGE OF PLACE
MEASURE AND SHAPE
LIVING THINGS
NATURAL PHENOMENA
BEHAVIOR AND THE WILL
LANGUAGE
HUMAN SOCIETY AND INSTITUTIONS
VALUES AND IDEALS
ARTS
OCCUPATIONS AND CRAFTS
SPORTS AND AMUSEMENTS
THE MIND AND IDEAS
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

I close with a few words about the latest, the Eighth. There was room to perpetuate and even extend previous errors -- for instance, the addition of copious nomenclatures (e.g., a few hundred words from Baseball with no relation among them) -- but there was also one more thing that new hands could ruin for the first time: the Index. Remember that the Third edition introduced a decimal numbering of the paragraphs within the pigeon holes; and remember that the reason for this was to enable a user to be directed by the Index to a single paragraph within the relevant pigeon hole so that he did not have to read through the entire pigeon hole to find words neighboring the word he had in mind and from whose clutches he was trying to be released. Now compare the entries for "satisfaction" (taken at random), in my trusty English 1911 edition and the latest Eighth American:

satirist 936	satirize 508.11, 512.12
satis: jam – 869	satisfaction 95.1, 107.1, 338.1,
– <i>superque</i> 641	396.6, 434.1, 457.7, 481.1,
satisfaction	481.2, 624.1, 624.3, 658.1,
[<i>see satisfy</i>]	991.1, 994.1
<i>duel</i> 720	satisfactional 658.7
<i>pleasure</i> 827	satisfactoriness 107.3, 991.1,
<i>atonement</i> 952	999.3
hail with – 931	satisfactory 107.11, 953.26,
satisfactorily 618	991.6, 999.20
satisfactory 648	satisfactory amount 991.1
satisfy <i>answer</i> 462	satisfied 95.15, 107.7, 953.21,
<i>convince</i> 484	994.6
<i>sufficient</i> 639	satisfiedness 107.1
<i>consent</i> 762	satisfy 8.18, 95.8, 97.5, 107.4,
<i>observance</i> 772	427.6, 434.2, 624.10, 624.13,
<i>pay</i> 807	658.4, 953.18, 991.4, 994.4
<i>gratify</i> 829	satisfying 97.6, 107.11, 624.21,
<i>content</i> 831	953.26, 994.7
<i>satiate</i> 869	satisfy oneself 970.11
<i>reward</i> 973	satisfy oneself on that point
– an obligation	953.19
926	satisfy one's obligations 641.11
– oneself 484	satisfy requirements 942.10
satrap 745	satori 173.1, 934.1

Index: 1911 (ed.Samuel Roget)

Index: Eighth American (2019) (ed.B.Kipfer, Ph.D.)

It is almost incredible that whereas Roget had originally broken down a given index entry into a series of sub-meanings (in italics) to direct you to the relevant pigeon hole – a practice that survived in all editions English and American for a hundred and fifty years, the present edition, though it continues to tell you with the “decimal number” which paragraph within a pigeon hole to go to, eliminates the sub-meanings and therefore gives you no direction at all *which* pigeon hole to try in order to find your word! Note also how the index pointlessly gives many cognate entries (e.g., *satisfactoriness* and *satisfactory*), something that is properly to be done within the pigeon holes themselves.

I am glad to say, in conclusion, that the English edition was published in the US by the publisher David McKay, and at any time there seem to be several copies available at abe.com.